# Drill Baby Drill

*And John and I will adopt the all of the above approach to meet America’s great energy challenges. Yes (app) . Those hundreds of billions of dollars being recirculated here in America, that means harnessing alternative sources like the wind, and the solar, and the biomass, and the geothermal, and the ethanol, and we’ll develop clean coal technology, and we’ll drill for the billions of barrels of oil that we have right now, warehoused underground including our resources offshore. We will drill here and drill now, and now is when you chant drill baby drill. Yes. (chant) Drill baby drill (chant). Drill baby drill.. (chant). Drill baby drill and mine baby mine, it is for the sake of our nation’s security, and of course our economic prosperity. We need American energy resources, brought to you by American ingenuity, and produced by American workers. (cheer) Yes…yes (cheer)*

(Sarah Palin, 10/25/08, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iolgiIvfV-0>)

*You know, last month Joe Biden, he told a voter, he said, and I quote: we’re not supporting clean coal. He’s called environmentally friendly offshore drilling ‘raping the outer continental shelf. Both Joe Biden and Barak Obama have opposed offshore drilling. Of course they’ve flip-flopped recently in debates, and in statements that they’ve made, [but], and that goes to someone’s judgment also in trying to figure out where are they on some of those issues, just straight talk. Tell Americans what you feel what you believe in, what you stand for. Straight talk!.*

*(Cheer)*

(Sarah Palin, 10/15/08, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XQbm35g_s20>)

#### Well here is our straight talk. This Affirmative is an exploration of two questions. First, what meaning is packaged into Sarah Palin’s ideological constellation ‘Drill baby drill’? And second, what are the ties between this constellation and the resolution we’ve been asked to endorse?

#### Urban Dictionary offers the following definition of drilling:

#### “To penetrate a woman in a fast ‘n’ furious style,” as in the sentence, ‘seriously mate, I drilled her last night.’

#### This differs slightly from the Dictionary.com definition of “to pierce or bore a hole in something.”…but only slightly. The connotation in both cases represents the relationship between an active subject (that which drills), and a passive recipient object (that which is penetrated).

#### The trick with Palin’s slogan is that it’s not entirely clear which of the two meanings is being articulated. Nature is simultaneously cast as an inanimate object, a thing to be penetrated and violently transformed, and also as a feminized subject who desires her own penetration, who desperately wants the ‘untapped reserves warehoused’ deep within her to be extracted through the will of science and the grit of American ingenuity. Of course the metaphor of rape is ridiculous – Nature clearly wants it, for the sake of our national security and economic growth.

#### The sexualization of nature at work here is mirrored by a narcissistic Western political subject, one that sees itself as objective, rational, and Enlightened, and thus entitled to mastery over nature. This model of subjectivity excludes all those it doesn’t see as identical to itself and is instrumental to the colonization of the geopolitical and natural worlds.

J Anne Tickner writes:

Although Ritvo's study is not specifically a feminist text, she makes reference to language employed by naturalists and animal breeders that sets both women and animals below human males in the natural hierarchy. The use of sexual metaphor, which feminists believe had the effect of establishing a male-dominated hierarchy, was also employed in the language of the scientific revolution. The taming of nature was usually described in gendered terms that reflected the social order. Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the sexual metaphors employed by Francis Bacon and other Enlightenment scientists. Central to Bacon's scientific investigations was a natural world, frequently described as a woman, that required taming, shaping, and subduing by the scientific mind: "I am come in very truth leading you to nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave."12 Social ecologist William Leiss agrees that Bacon's scientific project was centrally concerned with mastery over nature But while Leiss notes the sexually aggressive overtones in Bacon's language, he is less concerned with the implications of Bacon's sexual metaphors than with a scientific tradition that has resulted in the domination of certain men over other human beings. This system of domination has spread outward from Europe to the rest of the world through the appropriation of nature's resources.13 Feminist scholars such as Carolyn Merchant, Sandra Harding, and Evelyn Fox Keller, who have written about the origins of modern science, would agree with Leiss's argument that domination of nature was a central goal of modern science. Using a gendered perspective, however, they take his argument further: suggesting that the sexual imagery in seventeenth-century science was intrinsic to its discourse, they claim that the domination of certain men over other human beings, other cultures, and nature cannot be fully understood unless this gendered language is taken seriously. In her discussion of metaphors in science, Sandra Harding asks why certain metaphors, such as the rape of nature, have been dismissed by historians and philosophers as irrelevant to the real meaning of scientific concepts while others, such as the metaphor of nature as a machine, have been regarded as fruitful components of scientific explanation.14 Harding and Keller claim that these gendered metaphors are crucial for understanding Western science as a masculine enterprise. The separation of mind from nature and the investigator from his or her subject of investigation have been important goals for modern science's quest for objectivity. But as reason was separated from feeling and objectivity from subjectivity, science came to be defined in opposition to everything female. This kind of knowledge is consistent with a project that has involved the mastery, control, and domination of nature.15 These feminists therefore believe that such seventeenth-century gendered metaphors were fundamental to developing attitudes toward nature and women, as well as the racist attitudes toward non-Western peoples that I described; these attitudes have been consistent with the practices of an expansive and dominating international system. As seventeenth-century science associated nature and the body with women, so the mind, or rational thought, came to be associated with men. In the West, culture has generally been linked historically and symbolically with elite men whose writings, music, and art are enshrined as the canons of Western civilization. According to Merchant, this nature/culture dichotomy was used as a justification for devaluing women and keeping them in subordinate positions in early modern Europe. As documented by Merchant, Keller, and other feminist scholars, the Enlightenment was not a progressive time for women; as is often the case in eras that have traditionally been described as progressive, the position of women in public life suffered a setback in the seventeenth century. Women's association with a disorderly nature was personified by an increase in the persecution of witches, who were linked to the superstition and chaos that modern science was attempting to control and tame through its investigations. Both Merchant and Leiss note the legal metaphors in Bacon's language, metaphors that Merchant explicitly links to seventeenth-century witch trials.16 Simultaneously, the needs of early industrial capitalism stimulated a growing division of labor between home and workplace that began the process of severely curtailing the economic, political, and social options available to women.17 This transition to a capitalist market economy required a greater exploitation of natural resources than did the subsistence economy of feudal Europe. Merchant outlines changes Bin seventeenth-century English agriculture, which began to encroach on woods and fen lands in the pursuit of the higher yields required for production for the market. Seventeenth-century scientists justified their goals of "mastering" and "managing" the earth in the name of human progress and increasing material wealth. The demands of a market economy, and the increases in productivity that it generated, required the use of nonrenewable energy resources such as timber and coal. Rendering nature as a dead, inert object was essential for eliminating fears that the mining of metals and fuels crucial for the coming industrial revolution was a violation of nature's inner resources.

(J. Ann Tickner, Professor of International Relations at USC, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspective on Achieving Global Security, 1992, <http://library.northsouth.edu/Upload/Gender%20in%20IR.pdf>)

#### It is here worth noting the origins of our topic. Ana Nikolic, who submitted the topic paper, works in the Policy Resolution Group of Bracewell and Giuliani, a law firm that makes its money representing transnational oil companies in multibillion dollar deals. Just like Sarah they are right there on the sidelines, chanting drill baby drill. The question of affirming this topic is a question of whether or not we’re willing to chant it too.

#### And before you say something about solar and wind energy, please give us a break. There’s a reason they were included in the topic and it’s not because wind or solar pose a realistic alternative to fossil fuels. The topic is an endorsement of the status quo. Sarah Palin’s ‘all-of-the-above approach’ takes a more open-minded stance on energy than the topic we’ve been called to affirm. It’s time to face the facts – the debate community this year purposefully excluded the discussion of alternative energies. There were TWO resolutions that included alternative energies in the discussion and WE DID NOT VOTE FOR THEM, because they don’t mesh well with the hegemony and nuclear war impacts that debaters have been running for years. Instead, our community has bought into this exclusionary topic to ensure that we all serve the same interests as Palin and Bracewell and Giuliani, so we can run the same big impact arguments that for some reason keep winning debate rounds.

#### What interests are those exactly? Well I’d say the ex-governor laid it out pretty well. It is for the sake of our national security and of course our economic prosperity. These two reigning goals of policy discourse find their roots in colonialism. The way of relating to Nature expressed through drill baby drill, expressed through this year’s topic, is highly compatible with a way of relating to the Foreign and the Other in terms of domination and competition. The sexualization of the Other is a frequent factor in its subordination to the hegemonic model of subjectivity. The kind of knowledge produced through topical discussion thus feeds into endless cycles of colonial violence.

Greta Gaard writes:

Appeals to nature have often been used to justify social norms, to the detriment of women, nature, queers, and persons of color. The range of colonial assaults on sexuality -- from gender roles to same-sex behaviors to heterosexual practices -- is the reason I name the colonizers' perspective erotophobic rather than simply homophobic. This colonial erotophobia remained intact through the arrival of the Pilgrims, the establishment of the United States, and the waves of westward expansion that followed. In the twentieth century, narratives of colonialism and exploration continue to bear the stamp of erotophobia, as feminist critiques reveal. In her study of race and gender in international politics, Cynthia Enloe finds important connections between the conceptions of nationalism and of masculinity. In colonialist discourses of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the subordinated countries are feminized, the subordinated men are emasculated, and the colonized women are often depicted as sex objects by foreign men. One male writer described colonialism as the condition wherein a man's women are "turned into fodder for imperialist postcards. Becoming a nationalist requires a man to resist the foreigner's use and abuse of his women" ( Enloe 1989 , 44) in her study of U.S. polar expeditions, Lisa Bloom finds that "the explorations symbolically enacted the men's own battle to become men," and the recorded narratives left by the explorers present "U.S. national identity as essentially a white masculine one" ( Bloom 1993 , 6, 11). Both Enloe's and Bloom's texts reprint popular colonial postcard images of naked or partially clothed native women reclining on the ground in what Bloom calls the "odalisque pose" ( Bloom 1993 , 104). Like the colonizers of three and four centuries past, the explorers and imperialists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have used the perceived eroticism of native peoples as a justification for their colonization. Serving as a foundation for all imperialist exploits, colonial nationalism offers a definition of identity that is structurally similar to the master identity. Enloe defines a nation as "a collection of people who have come to believe that they have been shaped by a common past and are destined to share a common future. That belief is usually nurtured by a common language and a sense of otherness from groups around them" ( Enloe 1989 , 45; emphasis added). Nationalism, then, is "a set of ideas that sharpens distinctions between 'us' and 'them'. It is, moreover, a tool for explaining how inequities have been created between 'us' and 'them' " ( Enloe 1989 , 61). Similarly, the editors of Nationalisms and Sexualities explain that "national identity is determined not on the basis of its own intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not" ( Parker et al. 1992 , 5). Inevitably "shaped by what it opposes," a national identity that depends on such differences is "forever haunted by [its] various definitional others" ( Parker et al. 1992 , 5). Looking at these definitions of nationalism from an ecofeminist perspective, it becomes apparent that national identity bears a structural similarity to the master model as defined by Plumwood. National identity participates in two of the five operations characteristic of the master identity – radical exclusion and incorporation. Colonialist nationalism, however, depends on all five operations of the master model, including the linking postulates of backgrounding, instrumentalism, and

homogenization. Throughout the documents of explorers and colonists, native peoples are constructed as animal-like: they are perceived as overly sexual, and their sexual behaviors are described as sinful and animalistic. The indigenous women are eroticized, while the men are feminized -- and all these associations are used to authorize colonization. The feature of masculine identity that Enloe and Bloom seem to overlook and that Plumwood does not explicitly address is sexuality. Here again, feminist and ecofeminist theories fall short without a queer perspective. As Gayle Rubin has noted, "Feminism is the theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic desire, on the other" (1989, 307). Queer theorist Eve Sedgwick argues that gender and sexuality are "inextricable . . . in that each can be expressed only in terms of the other . . . in twentieth-century Western culture gender and sexuality represent two analytic axes that may productively be imagined as being as distinct from one another as, say, gender and class, or class and race" (1990, 30). From a queer ecofeminist perspective, then, it is clear that notions of sexuality are implicit within the category of gender. Simply stated, the masculinity of the colonizer and of Plumwood's master identity is neither homosexual, bisexual, nor transgendered. Heterosexuality -- and a particular kind of heterosexuality as well, a heterosexuality contained within certain parameters -- is implicit in conceptions of both dominant masculinity and Plumwood's master model. In the preceding examples, the discourse of nationalist colonialism contains specific conceptions not only of race and gender but also of sexuality. The native feminized other of nature is not simply eroticized but also queered and animalized, in that any sexual behavior outside the rigid confines of compulsory heterosexuality becomes queer and subhuman. Colonization becomes an act of the nationalist self asserting identity and definition over and against the other -- culture over and against nature, masculine over and against feminine, reason over and against the erotic. The metaphoric "thrust" of colonialism has been described as the rape of indigenous people and of nature because there is a structural – not experiential -- similarity between the two operations, though colonization regularly includes rape.

#### So you probably could have guessed by now that we’re not going to defend topical action. This Aff is a critique of the topic. It’s not topical. However it is intimately related to this year’s resolution. This is a concept we call being topic-ish, and it’s the standard we hold ourselves to as the Affirmative. We don’t think an Aff team should be able to get up and just say anything – however, so long as an Aff team is presenting an argument relevant to the topic, the negative should be able to find something to say.

#### We as a community must do away with the notion that a single approach to the topic, or to affirmation, is necessary, or even desirable. Framework and topicality are rooted in a desire to affirm a common, unified vision of debate. Such a unified vision inevitably reflects the values of hegemonic power.

Moira Gatens, Professor of Philosophy, writes:

It is not clear to me, taking into account the history of the constitution of this body politic, that it can accommodate anything but the same. I have suggested that the modern body politic is based on an image of a masculine body which reflects fantasies about the value and capacities of that body. The effects of this image shows its contemporary influence in our social and political behavior, which continues to implicitly accord privilege to particular bodies and their concerns as they are reflected in our ways of speaking and in what we speak about. It refuses to admit anyone who is not capable of miming its reason and its ethics, in its voice. Its political language has no vocabulary and no space for the articulation of certain questions. Our political body continues to assume that its active members are free from the tasks of reproduction, free from domestic work, free from any desires other those “whispered” to it by one of its Hobbesian “counselors” or “willed” in it by one of its laws. All this body can address is questions of access to “pre-defined” positions and “preconstituted” points of power and authority. It can not address the question of how or in what manner one occupies these points or positions. Nor can it address the limited conditions, dictated by the corporeal specificity of the occupant, on the possible actions open to that occupant. What it cannot address is how different bodies “Fill” the same “empty” social or political space. I wonder, in this context, whether the withdrawal of Pat Schroeder from the U.S. Presidential candidacy was related to this problem. She said, in her speech, that she was withdrawing because she could not “figure out” how to occupy the political sphere without turning over her desires, behavior, and plans to predetermined meanings which were at odds with her own intentions. I would suggest that this problem is, at least partly, related to the continuing fascination that we have for the image of the one body. It is an image that belongs to a dream of equity, based on corporeal interchangeability, that was developed to the full in nineteenth century liberalism. And it is a dream of men. Women, and others, were not copartners in this dream and to attempt to join it at this late stage is as futile as trying to share someone’s psychosis. The socially shared psychosis of egalitarianism was constructed to deal with a specific problem: to diffuse the power structure of seventeenth and eighteenth-century politics. This fantasy of the modern body politics, constituted by “the word” of men united, is not appropriate to women, and others, who were specifically excluded from it. For these “others,” who have never experienced the satisfaction of having their image reflected back to themselves “whole” or “complete” the fascination with this dream is not so binding. The cultural ego-ideal was never something that they could live up to without mnassive act of bad faith. But what are the alternatives? If what one is fascinated by is the image of one body, one voice, one reason, any deviation takes the form of gibberish. If woman speaks from her body, with her voice, who can hear? Who can decipher the language of an hysteric, the wails of a hyena, the jabbering of a savage – apart from other hysterics, hyenas, and savages? Our political vocabulary is so limited that it is not possible, within its parameters, to raise the kinds of questions that would allow for the articulation of bodily difference: it will not tolerate an embodied speech. The impotence of ort political vocabulary leads me to suggest that the more appropriate sphere for a consideration of these questions may be the ethical. And here I am using “ethical” in a sense perhaps long forgotten, where ethics is crucially concerned with the specificity of one’s embodiment. It is certainly a pre-Kantian notion. It is prior to the ever-narrowing political organization of ethics and prior to the conceptualization of ethics as reducible to a set of universal principles, dictated by reason (whose reason?). It is opposed to any system of ethics which elevates itself from a contingent form of life to the pretension of being the one necessary form of life. The most a universal ethic will permit is the expansion of the one body. Under pressure from its own insistence on equity, it may be forced to admit women, slaves, and others. It will not, however, tolerate the positing of a second, or a third or a fourth body. Prime Minister Hawke’s courting of the Aboriginal land rights movement prior to the Australian Bicentennial celebrationbs in 1988, could provide an example of my point here. He wanted to take the body politic off to the beauty parlor so it would look its best for the big birthday party. An important component of this beauty treatment involved attending to the blemishes on this body caused by the history of its abuse of Aboriginal bodies. It is instructive that Hawke wanted to ‘make up’ by calling for a compact, a term that is more at home in seventeenth-century political texts. The term carries connotations of an agreement between equals, between like beings, to join as a single body. Some Aborigines, on the other hand, called for a treaty, a term that carries connotations of an agreement between unlike beings to respect each other’s differences. It also implies a demand for the recognition of two bodies. Hawke resisted a treaty because this would be to recognize another voice, another body, and this raises the deepest fears. To recognize another body is to be open to dialog, debate and engagement with the other’s law and the other’s ethics. It seems important, if the possibility of dialog and engagement is to be opened up, that feminist politics recognize the futility of continuing to ask to be fully admitted into this fantasy of unity. This would be to stop asking of that body that it be “host”, since for women this would be to ask how can I live off myself—how can in engage in self-cannibalism? I would rather want to raise the question: whose body is this? How many metamorphoses has it undergone? And what possible forms could it take? And in responding to these questions it seems crucial to resist the temptation, noticeable in some feminist writing, to replace one body with two, one ethic with two, one reason with two. For this would be merely to repeat, in dual fashion, the same old narcissistic fascination involved in the contemplation of one’s own image. The most this will achieve is that we would succeed in throwing off the persona of Echo, who speaks but is not heard, only to join Narcissus at the pool.

(Moira Gatens, Professor of Philosophy at Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Corporeal Representations in/and the Body Politic, Writing on the body: female embodiment and feminist theory, 1997, p. 85-87)

#### This nomadic form of feminism seeks to restructure our relationship to the Other and to difference in a way that is not doomed to recreate violence. It requires critique at every level, from the content of the topic to the rules of the discursive game.

Rosi Braidotti, Professor of the Humanities, writes:

The term transdisciplinary can describe one position taken by feminists, passing in between different discursive fields, and through diverse spheres of intellectual discourse. The feminist theoretician today can only be “in transit,” moving on, passing through, creating connections where things where previously disconnected or seemed unrelated, where there seemed to be “nothing to see”. In transit, moving dis-placing – this is the grain of hysteria without which there is no theorization at all. In a feminist context it also implies the effort to move on to the invention of new ways of relating, of building footbridges between notions. The epistemic nomadism I am advocating can only work, in fact, if it is properly situated, securely anchored in the “in between” zones. I am assuming here a definition of “rigor” away from the linear Aristotelian logic that dominated it for so long. It seems to me that the rigor feminists are after is of a different kind – it is the rigor of a project that emphasizes the necessary interconnection-connections between the theoretical and the political, which insists on putting real-life experience first and foremost as a criterion for the validation of truth. It is the rigor of passionate investment in a project and in the quest of the discursive means to realize it. In this respect feminism acts as a reminder that in the postmodern predicament, rationality in its classical mode can no longer be taken as representing the totality of human reason or even of the all-too-human activity of thinking. By criticizing the single-mindedness and the masculine bias of rationality I do not intent to fall into the opposite and plead for easy ready-made irrationalism. Patriarchal thought has for too long confined women in the irrational for me to claim such a non-quality. What we need instead is a redefinition of what we have learned to recognize as being the structure and the aims of human subjectivity in its relationship to difference, to the “other.” In claiming that feminists are attempting to redefine the very meaning of thought, I am also suggesting that in time the rules of the discursive game will have to change. Academics will have to agree that thinking adequately about our historical condition implies the transcendence of disciplinary boundaries and intellectual categories.

(Rosi Braidotti, Director of Center for the Humanities at Utrecht, Mothers, Monsters, and Machines, Writing on the body: female embodiment and feminist theory, Pg 75-76)

**Renewing our relationship to the ‘Other’, by breaking down existing identities through nomadism, seeks to return the value of life to those marginalized by the status of ‘Otherness’ imposed by the current hegemonic state of mind.**

Zimmerman 94(Michael, Prof of Philosophy @ Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future, p.119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relations between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relations would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilations of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing one’s relations to God. Heidegger apparently thought along the lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might one again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any “being at all,” the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material “happiness” for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we could exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a would worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead.

**We seek to engage in this nomadism through our performance--Parodic politics breaks down hegemonic masculinity.**

**Braidotti 11** (2011, Rosi, “Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and sexual difference in contemporary feminist theory,” Columbia University Press, New York, e-book).

By analogy I would say: **what is politically effective in the politics of parody**, or the political practice of “as if,” **is not the mimetic impersonation or capacity for repetition of dominant poses, but rather the extent to which these practices open up in-between spaces where alternatie forms of political subjectivity can be explored. In other words, it is not the parody per se that will kill the phallogocentric posture, but rather the power vacuum that parodic politics may be able to engender**. (pg. 41)

#### And prefer our impact –universal imposition of societal calculation of life leads to the ultimate devaluation.

Michael **Dillon**, Professor, University of Lancaster, 19**99**, “Another Justice,” Political Theory 27(2), JSTOR

Otherness is born(e) within the sel**f** as an integral part of itself and **in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the** lack, absence, or **ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation**; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. **The subject** was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It **was never in possession of that self-possession** which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. **The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies** than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. **The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency** **for** the political arithmetic of States and **the political economies of capitalism**. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. **The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability**. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. **Once rendered calculable**, however, **units of account are necessarily submissible** not only to valuation but also, of course, **to devaluation. Devaluation, logically,can extend to the point of counting as nothing.** Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. **There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust.** However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, th**ey run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life.** Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase energy production in the United States via one or more of the following: a substantial reduction of statutory and/or regulatory restrictions on the production of crude oil, natural gas, and/or nuclear power; a substantial increase in grants, direct loans, loan guarantees, and/or tax incentives for electric power generation from coal, natural gas, nuclear power, and/or renewable energy sources.